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THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET-




HE impact of the secondary mortgage market on real estate transac-
tions is likely to be regarded as one of the most important develop-
ments in real property and finance law in the 1980s. Underlying the
technical jargon and mechanical functions of this market is a process of in-
teraction that will bring forth significant economic, social, and political
change. The financial incentives propelling the dramatic growth of the sec-
ondary mortgage market are already changing the way that lenders, borrow-
ers, developers, and investors in real estate interact. Likewise, the growth of
the market is causing a reassessment of the proper role of state and federal
governments in administering and developing the law of real property. Real
property law is shifting from a matter of state and local concern to one of
national concern so that the necessary resources of interregional, national,
and international capital markets will continue to be available for real estate
development.
The underlying forces at work in the secondary mortgage market also will
dramatically affect the future of real estate transactions. The emergence of a
successful secondary mortgage market is reshaping real estate transactions
in a manner similar to the way that the emergence of the automobile
changed society's view of distance. The automobile changed the manner in
which people viewed the distances between home, work, and shopping and,
at least in part, helped reshape the urban and suburban landscape of many
metropolitan centers. Likewise, the secondary mortgage market is reshaping
the goals, objectives, and economic incentives of parties to a real estate
transaction.
This Article examines the secondary mortgage market and how that mar-
ket acts as a catalyst for changing real estate transactions. In accomplishing
this goal the Article considers: (1) the history of the secondary mortgage
market; (2) the operation of the secondary mortgage market; and (3) the
implications for change caused by the secondary mortgage market.
* B.S. in Economics, Purdue University (the Krannert School of Management); J.D.,
University of Florida; LL.M., University of Illinois. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Uni-
versity School of Law-Indianapolis. I wish to thank Kenneth Braxton for his helpful re-
search assistance.
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I. HISTORY OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
During the 1930s the economic depression had a devastating impact on
real estate finance. I The inability of homeowners to meet their payment ob-
ligations, under what we would today consider short-term mortgages, led to
many foreclosures and to investors losing confidence in the mortgage lending
system. 2 In order to restore confidence in this sector of the economy and
make home ownership more accessible, the federal government initiated a
series of programs to develop both new mortgage instruments and a secon-
dary market for mortgages.
A. Developing the Market
In 1934 Congress created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
provided for the development of mortgage insurance programs. 3 FHA-in-
sured loans were developed as a way to insure payment to a lender in the
event of a borrower's default on a home mortgage. 4 In 1944 Congress ap-
proved a similar program to provide loan guarantees for Veterans Adminis-
tration (VA) loans. 5 Both the FHA and VA loan programs, as they
developed, supported new lending guidelines that led to smaller required
downpayments and the acceptability of long-term (twenty to thirty years),
fixed-rate mortgages.6 These programs improved lender confidence in real
estate financing and made homeownership more accessible to home buyers. 7
Congress established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in
1935.8 One of the RFC's most successful programs involved the buying of
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgages.9 This activity enhanced the
liquidity of FHA and VA loans, made the loans more attractive to loan origi-
1. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, PUB. No. 67, THE SECONDARY
MARKET IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 12 (J. Pheabus ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET]; Murray, The Developing National Mortgage Market:
Some Reflections and Projections, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 441, 442 (1972).
2. See P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE 308 (1981) (prior to 1934 residential mort-
gages often required a 50% down payment and a five-year term); Note, The Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary ControlAct of 1980 and Its Effect on the Mortgage Market, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 211, 211-12 (1981) (large down payments were usually financed with second
mortgages obtained through other lenders).
3. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 12; 0. JONES & L.
GREBLER, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET-ITS PURPOSE, PERFORMANCE, AND PO-
TENTIAL 115-17 (1961). Title III of the National Housing Act of 1934 provided for the crea-
tion of the FHA mortgage insurance program and authorized national mortgage associations
to be chartered by the FHA for the purpose of encouraging primary mortgage lenders to invest
in FHA loans. National Housing Act of 1934, Subchap. II, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707 to 1715z- 11(1980).
4. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 308-09.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1715n (1980); see FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at
12.
6. See P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 308-09.
7. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 601 (1983) (repealed 5 U.S.C. § 903 note, Reorg. Plan of 1957 No. 1
(1977)).
9. 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 117-19. By June 30, 1947, the RFC had
disbursed $320 million for the purchase of FHA-issued and VA-guaranteed loans. Id. at 117.
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nators, and thereby assisted the development of mortgage markets. 10
By 1938 Congress had created the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or Fannie Mae), which joined with the RFC to develop the secon-
dary mortgage market. 1 The RFC, until its dissolution in 1948, concen-
trated primarily on the purchase of existing or seasoned mortgages on new
houses in an effort to stimulate economic activity and new construction.' 2
The FNMA, on the other hand, used its buying and selling activities to ad-
vance a variety of policy goals.13 The FNMA supported, for instance, the
continued marketability of FHA and VA loans with fixed interest rates.
Fannie Mae also acted as a counterbalance to the cyclical effects of general
business recessions and the monetary intervention of a more active federal
government. 14 The FNMA provided assistance for special housing projects
that were unable to generate sufficient private investment, such as low in-
come housing. Finally, Fannie Mae introduced new mortgage arrange-
ments, including longer term financing with little borrower equity required
at a time when such arrangements were otherwise untested in the private
mortgage market.
In 1968 Congress divided the FNMA into two entities. One entity contin-
ued with the same name, but became a federally chartered corporation
owned by private shareholders. The second entity, the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), was a corporation
established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).1 5 As a result of the split the GNMA became primarily responsible
for the government's special assistance and housing support programs. The
10. See id. at 118-19. The RFC quickly established the marketability of FHA mortgages
by selling in 1936 all of the mortgages it acquired from loan originators in New York State to
the comptroller of that state, at a profit. Id. at 118. By the end of 1937 the RFC had sold $6.5
million of FHA loans. Id.
11. 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 118. The Federal Housing Administration
issued a charter to the National Mortgage Association of Washington on February 10, 1938,
which on April 5, 1938, was renamed the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA).
Id. By the end of 1938 FNMA held more than $80 million in FHA-issued mortgages in its
portfolio. Id.
FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 12. Congress created the FNMA in
1938 as a wholly owned government corporation. Federal National Mortgage Association
Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723h (1980). In 1968 the present FNMA became owned by
private stockholders, and its stock is publicly traded. The FNMA has a 15-member board of
directors; 10 members are elected by shareholders and 5 members are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States. The FNMA is subject to the regulatory authority of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, and even though its debt represents a general obligation
of the corporation, the U.S. Treasury stands behind FNMA with the discretion to purchase up
to $2.25 billion of its debt. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10-11.
12. 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 118. The RFC was terminated by legisla-
tion in June 1947, and dissolved in April of 1948. 15 U.S.C. §§ 603, 608, 609 (1983).
13. 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 34-39, 120-39.
14. The FNMA exerted this countercyclical influence by buying and selling loans from its
mortgage portfolio and thereby affecting the amount of funds available to lenders. In times of
"tight money," for instance, Fannie Mae would buy loans from lenders in order to provide
them with cash for additional loans. When lenders had relatively more cash and fewer loan
applications, the FNMA would sell loans to the lenders as investments.
15. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10-12 (Congress created
GNMA in 1968 by partitioning the original FNMA in accordance with title III of the Na-
tional Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1716b (1983)).
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FNMA, on the other hand, began to concentrate on the secondary mortgage
market activities of buying and selling loans for its portfolio, thereby increas-
ing the liquidity and investment opportunities of loan originators.' 6
As the FNMA and GNMA established a ready market for FHA and VA
loans, conventional loans, which lenders primarily hold in their own portfo-
lios, continued to be less liquid due to a lack of standard documentation and
underwriting guidelines. As various regions of the country began to experi-
ence rapid growth and real estate development in the late 1960s, the illiquid-
ity of conventional loans often left local lending institutions without
sufficient funds. 17 Although other areas of the country had excess funds, the
secondary mortgage market was not yet broad enough to address completely
the need for market reallocation of capital assets."' Thus, in 1970 Congress
created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac) in the Emergency Home Finance Act.' 9 The FHLMC, although au-
thorized to purchase FHA and VA loans, focused primarily on conventional
mortgages.20 At the same time, even though the FNMA was given new
authority to purchase conventional mortgages, it remained active in FHA
and VA loans. 21 Together, the FHLMC and FNMA sought to increase the
marketability of all mortgages by developing uniform standards to facilitate
the purchase and sale of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market and
thereby attract new sources of investment capital to the housing market. 22
By the 1980s the secondary mortgage market had become so successful
and had reached such a level of volume and technological advancement that
numerous private entities were entering the market. 23 These private entities
16. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10-12.
17. Id. at 12-13.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 9-10. Congress created the FHLMC in 1970 under title III of the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1983). The FHLMC is owned by the
twelve member Federal Home Loan Banks, which act as the central banks for the nation's
thrift industry consisting primarily of savings and loan institutions.
20. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 9.
21. Id. at 10-11.
22. See Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics, Con-
sumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397, 397-435 (1972)
(discussing the contribution of FHA to standardization and the efforts of the FHLMC and
FNMA to develop standardized forms to facilitate the secondary mortgage market and attract
new capital assets to the housing market); see also 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at
45-49.
23. Private participants include Sears Roebuck, Merrill Lynch, MGIC, Ticor Mortgage
Insurance Company, Residential Funding Corporation, G.E. Credit Corp., HOMAC-The
Home Mortgage Access Corp., and Salomon Brothers, among others. Nelson, Special Report:
Secondary Mortgage Market-Mortgage Originators Find Their Dance Cards Are Filling Up, 94
U.S. BANKER, July 1983, at 10 [hereinafter cited as Nelson, Special Report 19831. Additional
private participants in this market include Morgan Stanley & Co., Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. The Wall Street
investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers made $200 million, or 40% of its total 1983
profit, on mortgages. Monroe, Once Avoided, Mortgages Become a Big Business for Securities
Firms, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1984, at 23, col. 3; see also Nelson, Special Report 1983, supra, at 10
(outlining the impact of the secondary mortgage market); Nelson, Special Report: Secondary
Mortgage Market Update-It's the Morning After but the Party Rolls on: Will There Be Any
Hangovers?, 95 U.S. BANKER, Feb. 1984, at 24-32 [hereinafter cited as Nelson, Special Report
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provided additional investment services and competed with the three major
market entities, the FHLMC, FNMA, and GNMA.
24
B. Recent Trends and Events
Recent events affecting the general economy have also had an impact on
the developing secondary mortgage market. In the late 1970s and early
1980s market conditions proved to be unfavorable for mortgage lending in-
stitutions.25 The problem derived from the fact that most mortgage lending
institutions borrowed funds for mortgage lending in the short-term credit
markets, but held the mortgage loans in their portfolios as long-term invest-
ments.26 As interest rates reached higher and higher levels in the short-term
credit markets, mortgage lenders were stuck with large portfolios of long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages that provided a return that was less than their
cost of funds.27 As the spread between the yield on their mortgage loan
1984] (market is so good that number of nongovernment related firms involved is "multiplying
like rabbits").
Technological advances have played a crucial role in developing private participation in the
secondary mortgage market. LaGesse, Mortgage Networks Arrange Loans on Computers, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 23, 1984, at 1 (electronic advances and computer applications are facilitating
expansion and efficiency of market); Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt Discusses the Secondary
Mortgage Market, 123 TR. & EST. 15, 15-20 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Merrill Lynch's Rich-
ard Pratt]. This article also stated:
The mortgage is a much more transaction-intensive vehicle than a U.S. govern-
ment bond. You have a transaction associated with a mortgage every month,
while with a long-term bond the figure is every six months. Computers allow
these to be handled at low cost, and it also permits a very complicated assem-
blage of portfolios and investors to be coordinated.... [T]he secondary market
could not have developed without technology, and it is the technological foun-
dation that underlies [the growth of the] whole market.
Id. at 19.
24. See Mortgage-Related Securities Are Emerging as Serious Competition to Other Invest-
ment Vehicles, 17 LAND USE DIG., July 15, 1984, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Mortgage-Related
Securities] ("The three quasi-public secondary mortgage market agencies-FNMA, GNMA,
and FHLMC-account[ed] for about 95 percent of the mortgage-backed securities volume
transacted by the end of 1983."); Shattering Traditions: What's Ahead in Housing Finance?, 1
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS, Aug. 1984, at 2, 4 [hereinafter cited as Shattering Tradi-
tions] (in 1983 the FHLMC, FNMA, and GNMA accounted for over 61% of the secondary
mortgage market); Wantuck, More Competition for Fannie and Freddie?, NATION'S Bus., Nov.
1983, at 32, 32-35.
25. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING II 2.01(1)-
(3) (1981), 2.02(3)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1984) (the cost of funds to savings and loan associations con-
tinued to rise at a faster rate than the yield on their mortgage portfolios between 1975 and
1982, and cost of funds exceeded the yield on mortgage portfolio by 1980); Guttentag, Recent
Changes in the Primary Home Mortgage Market, 3 HOUSING FIN. REV. 221, 222 (1984) (refer-
ing to the 1980-1982 period as an insolvency crisis).
26. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.01(1)-(3) (1981), 2.02(3)(a)-(d)
(Supp. 1984); Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the Adjustable Rate Mort-
gage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan
Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 Mo. L. REV. 179, 179-83 (1982); see
also Comment, The New Mortgages: A Functional Legal Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 95,
95-102 (1982) (analyzing history of problems leading to development of modern mortgage
instruments).
27. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.01(l)-(3) (1981), 2.02(3)(a)-(d)
(Supp. 1984); Browne, supra note 26, at 179-83. The Assistant General Counsel for the
FHLMC explained:
The fundamental problems of the thrift industry, which is the largest supplier of
1986]
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portfolios and their cost of funds decreased, in some cases becoming nega-
tive, mortgage lending became less attractive. 28
The problem that these economic events presented to mortgage lenders
was twofold. First, lenders could not attract sufficient funds to use for addi-
tional mortgage lending, and the funds that they could attract carried a
higher average cost. Most mortgage lenders, including banks, savings and
loan institutions, and other thrifts, depended on customer deposits for a sub-
stantial portion of the funds that could be used to support their lending ac-
tivities.29 Government regulation kept the amount of interest that lenders
could pay to depositors around five percent. 30 At the same time mutual
funds and other investments became increasingly popular as safe alternatives
for depositing personal savings. 31 Because mutual funds and other invest-
ments could pay higher interest on deposits, many people who would other-
wise have kept their money in a local bank or savings institution moved their
money into these higher paying investments. 32 This process diminished the
ability of mortgage lenders to attract significant amounts of low-cost cash
deposits and forced them to look to short-term, high-cost markets to meet
their cash requirements. 33
The second major problem for mortgage lenders concerned the structure
of their investment portfolios. Many mortgage lenders had loan portfolios
consisting of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages that carried interest rates far
below the current market rates.34 Even though a portfolio of thirty-year
mortgages might have a much shorter actual payoff period, averaging ap-
proximately twelve years, mortgage lenders still viewed such mortgages as
unfavorable long-term investments. 3 5 Further aggravating the unfavorable
home mortgage loans, have resulted from the practice of lending on a long-term
basis with funds borrowed on a short-term basis, or "borrowing short and lend-
ing long." This practice has been particularly troublesome during times of high
interest rates.
Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted).
28. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.02(3)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1984); Cowan &
Foley, New Trends In Residential Mortgage Finance, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075,
1075-78 (1978).
29. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.01(1)-(3) (1981 & Supp. 1984). The
consumer or household saver represents the most important source of net savings, representing
between 66% and 80% of the gross national savings. Id. t 2.01(l)(a). For these savings to
flow into the mortgage market, the consumer or household sector must deposit them into the
financial intermediaries such as banks, savings and loan institutions, life insurance companies,
pension trusts, and real estate investments trusts. Id.
30. See Cowan & Foley, supra note 28, at 1075-78; Comment, supra note 26, at 95-102.
31. Cowan & Foley, supra note 28, at 1076 (other instruments included treasury bills and
corporate debt).
32. Between 1980 and 1982, for example, the Dreyfus Liquid Assets no-load mutual fund
investment account was providing returns of between 10% and 16%.
33. This outflow of investment or savings from low yielding investments is known as dis-
intermediation. When disintermediation resulted in an outflow of funds from mortgage lend-
ers, it reduced the amount of funds available for mortgage financing. See generally M.
MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.01(l)-(3) (1981 & Supp. 1984) (discussing invest-
ment trends in relation to cash flow requirements); Browne, supra note 26, at 182.
34. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.20(3)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1984); Cowan &
Foley, supra note 28, at 1075-78.
35. See Sloane, Your Money-New Version of Ginnie Mae, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1983,
[Vol. 39
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
yield prospects for the mortgage lender's portfolio was the trend of state
lawmakers and courts to declare due-on-sale clauses in mortgages unenforce-
able.3 6 The due-on-sale clause allows lenders to call the full amount of an
outstanding loan due and payable or to adjust the interest rate on an old loan
up to current market rates when a mortgaged property is transferred. 37 The
increasing inability to enforce the due-on-sale clause contained in outstand-
ing mortgages meant that mortgage lenders were forced to wait longer peri-
ods of time to restructure already poorly performing loan portfolios.
Specifically, the average thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage with a below mar-
ket rate of interest would likely stay on the books for a longer period of time.
All of these factors added to the poor liquidity position of mortgage lenders
and made their financial future appear rather bleak.
In responding to these market events, regulatory efforts addressed both
the high cost of funds and the low yield on loan portfolios. With respect to
the ability to attract funds, new regulations allowed mortgage lenders to
phase out the cap on interest rates that they could pay depositors and also
allowed lenders to develop new accounts and services that would appeal to a
broader range of potential customers.38 These changes were designed to
§ L, at 30, col. 1. For example, with 30-year mortgages, anticipated yields on Ginnie Maes are
quoted on the basis of a 12-year life span, rather than a 30-year life span, because of prepay-
ments, defaults, and other causes that statistically reduce the life of a portfolio. Even with a
12-year projected life, however, these long-term, fixed-rate mortgages were proving unprofita-
ble to lenders as a result of market changes in the 1970s and 1980s. Id.
36. See M. MADISON & J, DWYER, supra note 25, 3.04(i) (1981 & Supp. 1984); Berry-
hill, The Due-On-Sale Clause: A Marriage Gone Sour-A Checklist for the Practitioner, 16 U.
RICH. L. REV. 35, 35-116 (1981); Blocher, Due-On-Sale in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 31
CATH. U.L. REV. 49, 49-99 (1981); McGuire, The Due-On-Sale Controversy: Restraints on
Alienation and Federal Regulation of Real Estate Mortgages After de la Cuesta and the Garn-
St. Germain Act, 1982 S. ILL. L.J. 487, 487-532.
37. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 3.04(8) (1981 & Supp. 1984); Berry-
hill, supra note 36, at 35-116; Blocher, supra note 36, at 49-99. McGuire, supra note 36, at
487-532.
38. M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.02(3)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1984). Important in
this area were the following: (1) The authorization under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 of All-Savers certificates, which allowed lenders to attract deposits at below market rates
of interest by allowing depositors a $1000 exclusion from gross income (I.R.C. § 28 (1982));
(2) Under the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 the
regulated ceiling on interest rates payable on deposits was phased out and new accounts such
as NOW accounts were authorized to pay market rates of interest while other provisions al-
lowed for expanded services such as credit card issuing by federal savings and loan institutions
(12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982)). M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.02(3)(e); see
Gum, Competitor in the Financial Sector, OUTLOOK FED. HOME LOAN BANK Sys., Nov.
1984, at 6; Hermel, The Future of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, OUTLOOK FED.
HOME LOAN BANK Sys., Nov. 1984, at 27 ("Overall, the asset size of the industry has grown
at a rate of 19% a year since December, 1982, when the money market deposit account was
authorized, effectively deregulating interest rates on most savings institution liabilities. In
part, this substantial catch-up rate of growth reflects a catch-up from the artificially depressed
growth rates of the early 1980's, which resulted both from disintermediation attributable to
rate controls and the earning squeeze of that period."); How Thrifts Use Garn-St. Germain,
OUTLOOK FED. HOME LOAN BANK Sys., Mar./Apr. 1984, at 14, 14-16; see also CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM AND FEDERAL POLICY: RECENT
CHANGES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 7 (1983) (discussing an administrative approach to
meeting changing market needs).
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bring deposits back into the lending institutions and provide an available
source of funds for future loans.
Allowing lenders to pay higher rates to attract and retain new deposits
would have served no purpose if the lenders could not afford to pay the
higher market rates. The major roadblock to the lenders' ability to pay mar-
ket rates of interest to depositors was the low yield on loan portfolios. Mort-
gage lenders needed to develop new mortgage instruments that could
respond to long-term interest rate changes and thus improve their yield. 39
Consequently, mortgage lenders developed a series of new mortgage instru-
ments that featured adjustable rates of interest and resulted in a sharing of
future interest rate risk between the borrower and the lender rather than
having the lender assume all risk of interest rate change.4g
In conjunction with making mortgage interest rates more responsive to
market conditions, federal legislation preempted state usury rate restric-
tions4 1 and due-on-sale clause prohibitions. 42 Congress acted on the theory
39. See Sclar, From the Administrative Agencies-FHLBB Regulates Real Estate Loans-
Deregulation Style, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 273, 273-79 (1983).
40. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 25, 2.02(3)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1984); Browne,
supra note 26, at 179-224; Cowan & Foley, supra note 28, at 1075-96; Freeman, Alternative
Mortgage Instruments and Potential Mortgage Enforcement Problems, 14 URn. LAW. 760, 760-
64 (1982); Izeman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on Residential Financing,
10 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 3-28 (1981); Marcis, The Shake Out in Alternative Mortgage Instruments,
13 REAL EST. REV. 29, 29-33 (1983); Parks, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages-New Regulations for
National Banks and Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 70 ILL. B.J. 126, 126-30 (1981);
Comment, supra note 26, at 95-128. All of these above-referenced materials provide explana-
tion of various new mortgage instruments, how they work, and what their effect is likely to be
in the market place. See also THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING
150-52 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION] (recognizing the need to en-
courage the development and use of alternative mortgages in addition to the use of the fixed
rate, long-term mortgage); Guttentag, supra note 25, at 232-42 (identifying the potential vari-
ety of adjustable rate mortgages).
41. See Ewing & Vickers, Federal Pre-Emption of State Usury Laws Affecting Real Estate
Financing, 47 Mo. L. REV. 171, 171-98 (1982). The most far reaching preemption by the
federal government in this area occurred as a part of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which effectively eliminated state interest caps on first
loans to residences. 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982). The federal legislation is set up to allow states
to opt out of the pre-emption by acting before April 1, 1983. Id. at 176. At least 10 states have
done so. Id. See also Crafton, An Empirical Test of the Effect of Usury Laws, 23 J.L. & ECON.
135, 135-45 (1980); Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Development, 9 REAL
EST. L.J. 30, 30-38 (1980) (background perspective on how usury laws have affected real estate
development).
42. See Nelson & Whitman, Congressional Pre-emption of Mortgage Due-On-Sale Law:
An Analysis of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 243, 243-312 (1983). This article
provides an excellent overview of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982
(Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)). The authors discuss the enforceability problems of
due-on-sale clauses, the types of lenders and loans covered by the federal preemption provi-
sions of the Act, and the operation of a "window period" for preemption in the various states.
Id. at 260-309. The Act leaves some room for individual states qualifying for a "window
period" of exemption to extend the exemption from federal preemption, but in no case can a
state absolutely prohibit enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. Id. at 296. See also Barad &
Layden, Due on Sale Law as Pre-empted by the Garn-St. Germain Act, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 138,
138-50 (1983) (discussing the implications of federal preemption of due-on-sale state laws);
Berryhill, supra note 36, at 35-116 (identifying the factors that must be considered when pre-
paring to litigate a due-on-sale clause case); Blocher, supra note 36, at 49-99 (discussing the
due-on-sale clause and the secondary mortgage market); Herron, Federal Home Loan Bank
Board: Pre-Emptive Rights or Unbridled Powers?, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 529-43 (1983) (examin-
[Vol. 39
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that if only adjustable and competitive mortgage interest rates could keep
mortgage lenders profitable and thereby assure the availability of loanable
funds for home buyers, then artifical caps on interest charges needed to be
reduced, as did the barriers to loan liquidity caused by the reluctance of
individual states to enforce the due-on-sale clause.
Federal efforts were necessary in these areas of state real property law,
usury rates, and mortgage due-on-sale clauses because the developing na-
tional mortgage markets and the integrated national housing markets re-
quired enhanced uniformity for market efficiency rather than diversity and
fragmentation. The secondary mortgage market should play an important
role in keeping individual states supportive of these federally legislated meas-
ures because the goals of these measures are to assist mortgage lenders and
thus, ultimately, real estate developers, investors, and home buyers that de-
pend on financially healthy lending institutions. Through the buying and
selling of mortgages and mortgage-related securities, the secondary market
can direct funds in or out of states with divergent local law, such as states
that fail to enforce the due-on-sale clause.4 3 In this way the market will
reward or punish states for the way in which their local law corresponds to
investor desires and expectations at a national level. Consequently, pressure
for national standardization and uniformity of real property law, designed to
expand and facilitate, rather than hinder, the activity of the market has in-
creased. 44 Increased standardization and uniformity should improve market
efficiency, provide mortgage lenders with greater liquidity and profitability,
and reduce mortgage costs to homebuyers. 45
ing federal preemption and other overlapping areas of control); McGuire, supra note 36, at
487-532 (analyzing federal regulation of mortgages in light of recent case law and Garn-St.
Germain Act); Murry, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 12 REAL EST. L.J.
229, 229-42 (1983) (examining the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's decision to use due-on-
sale clauses in its adjustable rate mortgages); Rudolph, Schmelzer & Weiner, Federal Legisla-
tion Affecting Mortgage Credit, 38 Bus. LAw. 1311, 1311-27 (1983) (discussing federal pre-
emption of due-on-sale clause).
43. See 1985 State Legislative Proposals Affect the Secondary Market, 3 FREDDIE MAC
REP., Mar. 1985, at 1-5 [hereinafter cited as 1985 State Legislative Proposals] (inability to
enforce due-on-sale clauses makes projection of actual payout date of portfolios more difficult
and reduces potential return by delaying prepayments and payoffs). See generally Flick, Mort-
gage Markets and Mortgage-Related Securities: Developments and Implications, 44 MORT-
GAGE BANKING 54, 64 (1984) (discussing how structural changes within mortgage lending
system influenced 1983 housing boom); note 162 infra (for further discussion).
44. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 173-56 (discussing need to
use different types of mortgages).
45. See 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 90-91; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE, supra note 38, at 48; Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiative in the Mortgage-
Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 427 (1983) (cost of mortgage
credit could be reduced by as much as '/2 of 1%); Nelson, Special Report 1984, supra note 23,
at 30 (potential exists to provide a savings of 2% on the cost of a home); Home Economics-
Big Secondary Market in Mortgages Smooths Flow of Housing Funds, Wall St. J., July 11, 1982,
at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Home Economics]. See also Cahnman, Kamradt & Otto, Cop-
ing With Risk in the Secondary Market, 44 MORTGAGE BANKING, June 1984, at 10, 10-16
(lender liquidity and profitability reduces costs to consumers). See generally Shealy, The Sec-
ondary Market Makes Mortgages Move, 75 ABA BANKING J. 35 (1983) (involvement in secon-
dary mortgage market increases liquidity and sources of profitability); Bankers Forum, 76
ABA BANKING J. 9, 9-10 (1984) (originating and selling mortgages in secondary market pro-
vides liquidity and profitability for lenders concerned with volatile interest rates and risks of
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II. THE OPERATION OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
Analysis of the operation of the secondary mortgage market requires dis-
cussion of major market participants, major market offerings, current efforts
to expand the market, and reasons for participating in the market. In order
to discuss these elements of the market's operation, a definition of what is
meant by the secondary mortgage market is also required. For the purposes
of this Article, the secondary mortgage market is to be understood as that
wide range of mortgage loan activities consisting of packaging, pooling, buy-
ing, selling, and reselling of whole loans, loan participations, or bonds or
securities backed by mortgages. The development of futures trading or of an
organized exchange in trading whole loans, loan participations, or bonds or
securities backed by mortgages is also relevant to the definition because such
activity makes the secondary mortgage market more accessible and accepta-
ble to investors.46 This broad, comprehensive definition provides a most use-
ful approach, for the objective of this Article is not to belabor the mechanics
of technical asset and liability accounting, but rather to provide a critical
evaluation of the manner in which the secondary mortgage market is chang-
ing the structure and definition of real estate transactions. 47 Such a defini-
tion focuses broadly on the nature of the secondary financial and economic
activity. This overview provides a thorough background from which to ob-
serve that the economic incentives of the secondary mortgage market are
changing the way that developers, mortgage lenders, borrowers, and sellers
holding long-term mortgages); Shattering Traditions, supra note 24, at 2-11 (secondary mort-
gage market allows for greater liquidity, profitability, and for hedging investments against
inflation).
46. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 55-56 (discussing traded options and
futures markets); Cahnman, Kamradt & Otto, supra note 45, at 11-16 (discussing futures trade
on the Chicago Board of Trade); A Commercial Mortgage Rating System, 17 LAND USE DIG.,
Dec. 15, 1984, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Rating System] (discussing a commercial mortgage
rating system by Standard & Poor's Corporation); Labuszewski & Meisner, Controlling Mort-
gage Pipeline Risk, 44 MORTGAGE BANKING 45, 45-50 (1983) (discussing futures trade on the
Chicago Board of Trade); A Mortgage Exchange, 18 LAND USE DIG., Feb. 15, 1985, at 2 (a
national mortgage exchange similar to the New York Stock Exchange has been proposed by
the chairman and president of FNMA).
47. My definition of the secondary mortgage market is more comprehensive than defini-
tions offered by others who have written in the area. For instance David F. Seiders has said:
Our definition of secondary market requires that mortgage assets change hands
because there is a fundamental difference between sales of assets and borrowing
to finance holdings of assets; the definition reqiures exchanges of mortgage assets
for cash because this paper ... is concerned primarily about flows of funds to
mortgage borrowers. These two requirements exclude ... (1) "swaps" of mort-
gages by private institutions for Fannie Mae--or Freddie Mac-guaranteed
pass-through securities that represent ownership interests in the same mort-
gages; and (2) issues of mortgage-backed bonds and resales of these bonds. ...
[S]waps increase the quality and liquidity of mortgage assets.., but the swaps
(per se) are irrelevant from a flow-of-funds point of view. Mortgage-backed
bonds ... [are] a form of borrowing rather than a sale of assets.
Seiders, The Future of Secondary Mortgage Markets: Economic Forces and Federal Policies, 3
HOUSING FIN. REV. 319, 322-23 (1984) (footnote omitted); see also 0. JONES & L. GREBLER,
supra note 3, at 4-5 (these authors define the secondary mortgage market as not including loan
activity when an advance commitment is in place for another lender to purchase the origina-
tor's future loans before they are made).
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interact and altering the way in which we, as a society, view the respective
roles of state and federal government.
A. Major Participants
The major participants in the secondary mortgage market include the
GNMA, FNMA, and the FHLMC. Certain private entities are also heavily
involved, but the GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC remain responsible for
most of the activity in the secondary mortgage market.4 8
1. GNMA. The GNMA was created by Congress in 1968 and through its
secondary mortgage market activities supplies mortgage credit for govern-
ment housing objectives in that segment of the housing market for which
conventional financing is not readily available.4 9 The GNMA primarily
deals with the purchase of subsidized and unsubsidized single-family and
multi-family FHA and VA mortgages. 50 The GNMA also guarantees pass-
through mortgage-backed securities that are issued by HUD-approved mort-
gagees and that represent interest in FHA, VA, and FmHA (Farmers Home
Administration) mortgages. 5' The GNMA is a wholly owned government
corporation within HUD, and its mortgaged-backed securities carry the full
faith and credit of the United States. 52
2. FNMA. Congress created the FNMA in 1938 as a wholly owned gov-
ernment corporation, but in 1968 Fannie Mae became owned by private
shareholders. 53 The FNMA purchases single-family and multi-family FHA,
VA, and conventional mortgages.5 4  The parties from whom the FNMA
buys consist primarily of mortgage companies, mutual savings banks, com-
mercial banks, credit unions, savings and loan institutions, and for second
mortgages, finance companies. 55 The FNMA issues guaranteed Mortgage-
Backed Securities (MBSs), which are backed by loans in its own portfolio as
48. See Mortgage-Related Securities, supra note 24, at 1 ("The three quasi-public secon-
dary mortgage market agencies-FNMA, GNMA, and FHLMC-accounted for 95% of the
mortgage-backed securities volume transacted by the end of 1983."); Shattering Traditions,
supra note 24, at 2, 4 (in 1983 the FHLMC, FNMA, and GNMA accounted for over 61% of
the secondary mortgage market); Wantuck, supra note 24, at 32-35.
49. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 11 (GNMA was created by
Congress in 1968 in conformance with title III of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1716-1716b (1978)).
50. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at It.
51. Id. As of December 1982 GNMA had guaranteed more than $143 billion of GNMA
securities. Id.
52. Id. at 12; Strine, New Commercial Devices-Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1011, 1013-14 (1978). The GNMA guarantee provides that in the event
an issuer of a mortgage-related security fails to make a timely payment of principal and inter-
est, GNMA will continue the payments. Id.
53. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10 (in 1968, in conformance
with title III of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1716b (1978), FNMA was parti-
tioned into GNMA and FNMA); see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
54. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10.
55. Id.; Leibold, Uniform Conventional Mortgage Documents: FHLMC Style, 7 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435, 438 (1972) (FNMA's traditional market has been with mortgage
bankers who typically roll over mortgages very quickly).
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well as by participations in loans that are pooled or packaged through other
lenders.56 Even though FNMA stock is publicly traded, the FNMA is sub-
ject to the regulatory authority of the Secretary of HUD, and the U.S. Treas-
ury stands behind FNMA obligations with discretionary authority to
purchase up to $2.25 billion of FNMA debt. 57 As a result, the FNMA is
considered by the credit markets as having "agency status."58
3. FHLMC. Congress created the FHLMC in 1970 primarily to provide
liquidity for mortgage lenders by developing and maintaining the secondary
mortgage market in conventional residential mortgages.59 The FHLMC
buys conventional, FHA, and VA single-family and multi-family loans as
well as home improvement loans. 6° Sellers to the FHLMC consist primarily
of savings and loan institutions, but also include mortgage bankers and com-
mercial banks.6 1 The FHLMC sells mortgage-backed securities, issues other
securities that are debt obligations secured by conventional mortgages, and
operates a guarantor program.62  Because the FHLMC is a corporation
whose stock is wholly owned by the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks, 63
the FHLMC is able to elevate its securities to the status of obligations of the
United States."4
4. Private Entities. Several private entities buy, package, and sell mort-
gages and mortgage-related securities. 65  For the most part, these private
entities concentrate on pools of individual mortgages that exceed the statu-
tory limits on loans that the FHLMC and FNMA can purchase. 66 Private
56. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 10-11; see infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
57. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 11.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 9 (FHLMC was created by Congress in 1970 in conformance with title III of the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1978)).
60. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 9.
61. Id.; Leibold, supra note 55, at 438 (traditionally the FHLMC market has primarily
consisted of savings and loan associations).
62. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 9-10; Strine, supra note 52, at
1023.
63. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 9-10; Strine, supra note 52, at
1023.
64. See Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt, supra note 23, at 15; Wantuck, supra note 24, at 34.
65. See supra note 23.
66. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 8; see Wantuck, supra note 24,
at 33, 35. At the time the statutory limit was $108,300 and private parties had unsuccessfully
objected to efforts to raise that limit to facilitate financing to high-cost regions of the country.
The objectors argued that such areas were not relevant for federal intervention since a
$108,300 loan required a family income of $60,000. Id. at 33, 35. In essence the objectors
claimed that the private market could accommodate these loans and that people in this income
range were not the type of people in need of federal assistance. Id. at 35.
The new loan limits, effective for mortgage purchases on or after Jan. 1, 1985, are as follows:
$115,300 for mortgages of single family homes; $147,500 for mortgages on two-family homes;
$178,200 for mortgages on three-family homes; $221,000 for mortgages on four-family homes.
These maximum loan limits are 50% higher for homes in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam for
FHLMC and in Alaska and Hawaii for FNMA since these areas are considered high-cost
housing areas. In second mortgages on a one-to-four family home the FNMA and FHLMC
limit is $57,650 and in Hawaii it is $86,450. If both the first and second mortgage on a prop-
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entities concentrate their activities in this area because the government rela-
tionship attributed to the GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC allow those entities
a better reception in the credit markets for their mortgage-related securi-
ties.67 Private entities thus are hindered more by higher costs than are
GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC in the competition for the same mortgages.68
Private mortgage insurance companies (PMICs) are important to the suc-
cessful market operation of private entities in the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. PMICs insure the obligations of the underlying conventional mortgages
in a fashion similar to the FHA insurance provided in FHA loans.69 PMICs
and the FHA differ, however, in that the FHA will insure a lender for the
full amount of an outstanding loan in the event of default by a borrower, but
the PMIC typically will insure only the top twenty-five to thirty percent of a
loan. This limitation is significant if a borrower defaults and the property is
sold at a foreclosure sale for less than the amount that is owed on the out-
standing loan. With insurance provided by a PMIC, the lender will be in-
sured against the shortfall only to the extent of the PMIC exposure level of
twenty-five to thirty percent. Any shortfall in foreclosure sale proceeds be-
yond the insured level will be borne by the lender. In addition to this insur-
ance function, PMICs can provide a modified guarantee for mortgage-
related securities that are issued by private entities70 and act as conduits for
groups of primary mortgage lenders that individually lack a sufficient vol-
ume to participate in the secondary mortgage market. 7'
B. Major Offerings
The major offerings in the secondary mortgage market that will be dis-
cussed in this Article include: the private sale of whole loans or participa-
tions; Ginnie Mae Securities; Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) issued
through the FNMA; Participation Certificates (PCs) and Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) issued through the FHLMC; Swap programs
run by the FNMA and FHLMC; and mortage-backed bonds. The growth of
activity in the secondary market offerings has been dramatic: an estimated
sixty-five percent to seventy-five percent of all new loans are presently sold
through the market. 72 As the secondary mortgage market matures and ex-
erty are owned by FNMA then the total can not exceed the maximum limit set for the first
mortgage. [Current Update] HOUSING & DEV. REP. (BNA) 578-79 (1985).
67. Lance, supra note 45, at 430-34; Wantuck, supra note 24, at 32-35.
68. Lance, supra note 45, at 430-34 (because private entities need to provide a higher
return to investors, their offerings are, in essence, more costly); Wantuck, supra note 24, at 32-
35.
69. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 8-9; P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
2, at 308-10 (FHA insurance provided 100% coverage on the loan amount whereas PMI gen-
erally insures the top 25% of value on a loan not exceeding 95% of the property's value that is
securing the loan).
70. See Kanner, Financing Ideas, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 344, 346 (1982); Lance, supra note
45, at 427; Strine, supra note 52, at 1012-13, 1040.
71. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 8-9.
72. Shattering Traditions, supra note 24, at 2, 5; see also Brendsel, Home Mortgages Learn
to Compete in the Capital Markets, TR. & EST., July 1984, at 35, 37 (illustrating the dramatic
growth in sale of securitized mortgage pools, the article identifies an increase in sales from $0
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pands, mortgage-related securities are becoming more competitive with cor-
porate securities in the investment market. 73
In considering specific market offerings two concepts must be defined.
The first concept is mortgage pooling or packaging. Single home loans are
not sold individually into the secondary mortgage market; they must be
"pooled" or "packaged." For purposes of this Article, the terms "pooling"
and "packaging" refer to the process whereby primary mortgage lenders,
also known as originators, group similar loans together to create a sufficient
basis for investment. The resulting pool or package of loans is sold to inves-
tors or used as the security for the offering of a mortgage-backed security.74
The second concept is that of a pass-through security. The sale of a loan
participation or of a mortgage-backed security is said to be a pass-through
security when the monthly payments of principal and interest on each of the
underlying mortgages merely passes from the party servicing the loans, less a
fee for servicing, to the investor.75 With a straight pass-through security, the
investors get only their respective share of the funds actually collected on the
loans. Thus, if some of the borrowers do not make their monthly payments,
the investors receive less for that month.
Pass-through securities can also be fully or partially modified. A fully
modified pass-through security involves an arrangement in which the
monthly pass-through of principal and interest is fully guaranteed by an en-
tity such as the GNMA, FNMA, or FHLMC.76 The guarantee means that
investors will receive a stated amount each month even if some borrowers
in 1970 to more than $200 billion in 1982); Flick, supra note 43, at 62 (for the years 1982 and
1983, 60% to 70% of new mortgages were sold in the secondary mortgage market); Guidelines
for Rating Securities Backed by Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 17 LAND USE DIG., Oct. 15, 1984,
at 3 (the estimated volume of trading in mortgage pass-through securities issued by federal
agencies soared from $100 billion to over $500 billion from 1981 to 1983); Nelson, Special
Report 1983, supra note 23, at 10 (by 1990, the secondary market is expected to furnish 2/3 to
3/4 of all net new funds for the primary market).
73. See Bogdanich, Funds that Buy Ginnie Maes Are Luring Investors, Wall St. J., Apr. 24,
1985, at 35, col. 2 (Ginnie Mae securities are becoming increasingly popular investments);
Monroe, supra note 23, at 23, col. 3 (Henry Kaufman, Chief Economist for Salomon Brothers,
Inc., says that the market for mortgage-related investments has become so successful that it
may pose a threat to the corporate bond market; he is concerned that there may be a crowding-
out of the corporate borrower in the market place); Mortgage-Related Securities, supra note 24,
at I (mortgage-related securities are viewed as serious competition to other investments by
Kenneth Leventhal & Company).
74. See generally Kanner, supra note 70, at 344-46 (similar type mortgages are packaged
together to provide an investment opportunity with a greater and more predictable cash flow
and life expectancy; packages also are designed to make investment supervision by the investor
more manageable than trying to deal with numerous individual loans).
75. See Lance, supra note 45, at 427; Strine, supra note 52, at 10 12-13, 1040. Servicing a
loan involves the process of collecting the monthly payments from the borrowers, keeping the
books, and remitting the pass-through amount to investors. Some loan organizations continue
to service their loans for the fee income it generates, but others contract away the servicing
responsibilities. (One savings and loan institution in Lubbock, Texas, informed me through
their accounting department that they received 5% of collections plus any prepayment penal-
ties and all origination fees when they serviced loans sold to investors through the secondary
mortgage market.) In packaging arrangements the actual mortgages themselves are typically
held by a trustee or custodian for the benefit of the payment guarantor or for the benefit of the
holder of the security. See id. at 1012-13.
76. See Lance, supra note 45, at 427; Strine, supra note 52, at 1040.
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fail to make their monthly payments. A partially modified pass-through se-
curity generally involves a guarantee by a PMIC to insure against a short-
fall in actual collections relative to the expected pass-through amount, usu-
ally five or ten percent.77 This partial guarantee means that the PMIC will
make up for any shortfall in actual monthly payments from borrowers up to
the predetermined level of five or ten percent. Any shortfall beyond the in-
sured amount represents a reduction in return to the investors.
1. Private Sales. Private sales typically consist of the sale of whole loans or
loan participations to private investors without using a government agency
as an intermediary. The private sale of whole loans is a significant if not
major part of the secondary market; in 1982 such sales amounted to approxi-
mately $35 billion. 78 In addition to selling whole loans to other investors,
loan originators also sell loan participations, which allow investors to
purchase a share in the expected return on the mortgage pool. 7 9 In arrang-
ing these sales, the loan originator may negotiate directly with the investor
or the lender may choose to use a conduit, such as a PMIC, to package the
loans or issue pass-through securities to investors.80
Lenders generally sell their whole loans and participations to insurance
companies, pension funds, commercial banks, mutual savings banks, or sav-
ings and loan institutions. 81 The sale or participation agreement contains
loan and performance requirements and establishes a servicing arrange-
ment.82 When whole loans are sold the servicing function is frequently
transferred as well, but when a loan participation is sold the loan originator
almost always continues to service the loans. 83
If the mortgages are converted to pass-through securities to be issued by
private entities rather than by governmental entities, then compliance with
77. See Kanner, supra note 70, at 346 (as to the use of PMI to insure the pool); Lance,
supra note 45, at 427; Strine, supra note 52, at 1040.
78. Nelson, Special Report 1983, supra note 23, at 10. In comparison, the FHLMC,
FNMA, and GNMA had almost $300 billion in volume in 1984. 4 FREDDIE MAC REP., Jan.
1986, at 3.
79. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 22.
80. See id.; Nelson, Special Report 1983, supra note 23, at 18-20, 71. The private conduits
or entities that get involved in the secondary mortgage market generally assist in the sale of
whole loans, loan participations, or mortgage-related securities that are not readily salable to
the government-related entities, GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC. Id. For a discussion of the
activities of private entities, see supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
81. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 22; see also Ramzy, A Secon-
dary Market for Privately Held Purchase Money Mortgages?, 13 REAL EST. REV. 84, 84-88
(1983) (indicating a growing market potential for individuals as sellers and investors in private
purchase money mortgages).
82. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 22. Matters of specific
negotiation will include the following: (1) whether whole loans or participations are sold;
(2) yield to the investor; (3) total dollar amount of a transaction; (4) fees paid to the purchaser
at time of commitment; (5) whether or not servicing is released; (6) type of properties; (7) loca-
tion of properties; (8) maximum and minimum loan amounts; (9) loan-to-value ratios on the
underlying mortgages; (10) method of monthly remittance to investor; (11) coupon rate of
loans in package; (12) whether funding shall be immediate or in the future; (13) underwriting




the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission is required.8 4
Generally, the pools include only single-family conventional mortgage loans
on owner-occupied residences.85 Lenders typically base these mortgages on
a loan-to-value ratio of eighty percent or less, but this ratio can be higher if
private mortgage insurance is used on the underlying mortgages.8 6 Standard
& Poor's provides a rating service for these private issues.8 7 The size of a
pool of loans supporting such an issue may vary, but is usually a minimum
of $20 million for a public offering of the securities and $10 million for a
private placement of the securities.88 When a lender has less than these min-
imum amounts, it can use a PMIC to pool its loans with the loans of other
lenders.89
2. Ginnie Maes. Ginnie Mae issues three basic types of securities:
(1) straight pass-through securities, in which the GNMA guarantees the
payment of principal and interest as collected; (2) fully modified pass-
through securities, in which the GNMA guarantees the full payment of in-
terest and principal whether or not it is actually collected; and (3) bonds that
provide semi-annual interest payments and periodic redemption and are sub-
ject to call.90 Generally, the loans in the pool that supports any given Ginnie
Mae security must have the same lender and must be of similar type with
respect to interest rate, the type of property (single-family or multi-family)
that secures the loan, and maturity. 91 In 1983, however, the GNMA intro-
duced a new security known as the Ginnie Mae II. This security can be
backed by a pool of mortgages with different individual interest rates.92 The
Ginnie Mae II works on the concept of jumbo pools, which combine mort-
gages from many different lenders into a single package. 93 Larger pools offer
the opportunity for regional diversification of loans within a package and
should provide a better statistical basis for projecting actual prepayment
schedules. 94 All of the GNMA guarantees are backed by the full faith and
84. See id. at 30.
85. See id. Seasoned loans, loans that are one year or more old, and variable rate loans
can be included. Id. Special pools may also be formed to offer mortgage-backed securities
when all of the underlying mortgages are on multi-family housing units or are all second
mortgages.
86. See id.
87. See id. General requirements for the pool will be set by the agency that issues the
security and will include 5% mortgage guarantee insurance and 1% special hazard insurance
in order to get an AA rating from Standard & Poor's. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 30-31.
90. Miller, Regulation of Trading in Ginnie Maes, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 39, 42 (1982). This
article provides a detailed background to Ginnie Maes.
91. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29.
92. Sloane, supra note 35.
93. Id. The original Ginnie Mae I represented a pool of about 50 FHA or VA mortgages
generated by a single lender. Id. The new Ginnie Mae II pools are much larger and, although
they typically require the pooling of mortgages from several different lenders, a sole issuer with
a large volume of loan originations may generate the entire pool. Id.
94. Id. Ginnie Maes have a maximum life of 30 years, but their anticipated yields are
quoted on a 12-year life. Id.
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credit of the United States. 95
If a lender wants to hold Ginnie Maes in its portfolio or sell them, it must
assemble a pool of mortgages and complete required documentation in order
to obtain approval from the GNMA for a guarantee.96 Subject to favorable
review, the GNMA issues a commitment to guarantee and assigns a pool
number. 97 When the GNMA issues a guarantee the underlying mortgages
are delivered to a custodian under a custodial agreement. 98 Under that
agreement, the custodian holds the mortgages for the benefit of the GNMA
and upon default, which is the failure of the lender to meet the continuing
terms of the GNMA guarantee agreement, endorses the mortgages and de-
livers them to the GNMA. 99
The individual lenders continue to service the loans and to remit monthly
interest and principal payments to Ginnie Mae certificate holders. 1° For
the Ginnie Mae II securities, servicers collect the principal and interest pay-
ments and deliver them to Chemical Bank in New York. 10 1 Chemical Bank,
acting as central paying agent, then pays each Ginnie Mae II certificate
holder through a single monthly check regardless of the amount of securities
purchased.' 0 2 This innovation saves time and money by eliminating the
prior practice of issuing separate individual checks for each pass-through
security. This device, along with the introduction of book entry transfers in
1985, has also enhanced the volume of transactions that can be handled in
the market. 103
The typical lender involved in issuing Ginnie Maes is a mortgage banking
company, but some savings and loan institutions, savings banks, commercial
banks, and credit unions also issue Ginnie Maes. °4
3. MBSs and PCs. The FNMA may purchase whole loans or participa-
tions on which Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) are issued and offered to
investors, or for a fee it may issue MBSs to be returned to the portfolio of the
original lender or originator. 10 Likewise, the FHLMC may purchase whole
95. See Strine, supra note 52, at 1013-14.
96. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29; Strine, supra note 52, at
1014-15.
97. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29; Strine, supra note 52, at
1015.
98. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29; Strine, supra note 52, at
1016.
99. See Strine, supra note 52, at 1016.
100. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29.
101. See id.
102. See id. (using the central paying agent reduces paperwork for the investors receiving
monthly payments because they receive one total check for their investments rather than nu-
merous checks); see also Pierce, Ginnie Mae's Success Story How 54 People in Washington
Attract Billions to the Mortgage Market, OUTLOOK FED. HOME LOAN BANK SYs., Nov. 1984,
at 8, 10 (referring to the use of the central paying agent and also stating that the value of trades
in Ginnie Maes at present is approximately $3.6 billion a day).
103. 4 FREDDIE MAC REP., Jan. 1986, at 3 (The FHLMC pioneered book entry transfers
in 1985).
104. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 29.
105. See id. at 26-28, 33-34.
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loans or participations on which its Participation Certificates (PCs) are is-
sued, or for a fee it may issue PCs for return to the portfolio of the original
lender. 10 6 PCs and MBSs, whether sold directly to investors by the FNMA
or FHLMC or simply returned to the portfolio of the originating lender,
each offer purchasers a guarantee providing for a fully modified pass-
through security,' 0 7 and each represents an undivided interest in conven-
tional and seasoned FHA and VA mortgages.108
Each entity, the FNMA and FHLMC, has its own procedure and guide-
lines for sales, participations, and issuing of securities.109 If the issues are
packaged and returned to the lender or loan originator, they can be held in
portfolio as a more liquid asset than the previously held mortgages.I 0 The
loan originators generally retain responsibility for servicing the loans."'
In addition to these activities, the FHLMC and FNMA offer a swap pro-
gram that involves the exchange of a lender's mortgages for the FHLMC's
PCs or the FNMA's MBSs."12 When the lender receives the PCs or MBSs,
it generally sells them to market investors."13 This process provides liquidity
for mortgage lenders while creating an infusion of new loanable funds that
can provide many additional home loans for homebuyers. '14 The swap pro-
gram is not inconsequential and amounted to as much as $32.84 billion in
1982 and $24.57 billion in 1983.115
4. CMOs. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) are mortgage-
backed securities that the FHLMC pioneered. 16 In the first three months of
1984 CMOs constituted approximately one-third of the amount raised by all
106. See id. at 23-25, 31-33. FHLMC also issues a security known as the Guaranteed
Mortgage Certificate, which is likewise backed by mortgages but pays investors semi-annually.
Id. at 50; Strine, supra note 52, at 1023-25.
107. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 9, 11, 21.
108. See id. at 21.
109. See id. at 23-25, 26-28, 31-34 (setting out the procedures and guidelines).
110. See, e.g., id. at 50.
111. See id. at 23-25, 26-28, 31-34.
112. See Flick, supra note 43, at 58.
113. See, e.g., Mortgage Swapping Creates $10 Billion in New Funding, Washington Post,
Sept. 10, 1983, at E28, E30, col. 2 (Financial Corp. of America arranged to make several swaps
with FHLMC starting with a $2.6 billion swap in which it intended to sell the PCs to investors
and use the cash to make additional home loans).
114. Id. (The $2.6 billion initial swap between Financial Corp. of America and FHLMC is
expected to fund about 32,500 new homes).
115. Flick, supra note 43, at 58. The FHLMC accounted for $21.94 billion in 1982 and
$15.54 billion in 1983; FNMA accounted for $10.9 billion in 1982 and $9.03 billion in 1983.
Id. These activities are in addition to other programs, including the direct cash purchase pro-
grams, designed to add loans to the FHLMC or FNMA loan portfolio in order to provide
assured liquidity and new cash for continued lending by primary mortgage lenders. These
other programs amounted to $2.2 billion in 1982 and $4.2 billion in 1983 for FHLMC, and to
$3.1 billion in 1982 and $4.3 billion in 1983 for FNMA. Id.
116. See Brendsel, supra note 72, at 35; Maller, The Collateralized Mortgage Obligation:
The Latest Phase in the Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 299, 299-
314 (1985) (good background discussion of the CMO); see also 4 FREDDIE MAC REP., Jan.
1986, at 4 (the success of the FHLMC CMO has brought private companies into the market,
such as American Savings and Loan, which issued a $220 million CMO in December of 1985).
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corporate debt issues.1 17 In addition to bringing billions of dollars into the
primary mortgage markets, CMOs are given credit for lowering the cost of
home mortgages by twenty-five basis points or one-quarter percent between
June and December of 1983.118 Unlike other pass-through securities, the
CMO does not provide monthly payments to investors. Instead, the issuing
entity makes interest payments at the coupon rate on the outstanding princi-
pal balance in the same manner that payments are made on corporate
bonds. 119
The FHLMC designed CMOs to make investments in mortgage-backed
securities more manageable and thus more appealing to investors.1 20 Mort-
gagors on the underlying mortgages in a mortgage pool tend to prepay or
default on their loans faster as interest rates fall and to repay more slowly as
interest rates rise. 121 Consequently, the actual life and yield of an invest-
ment in a mortgage-backed security is unpredictable.1 22
Freddie Mac developed the CMO in an attempt to deal with these
problems. 123 A single pool of mortgages provides a payment stream that is
allocated serially to several classes of securities. 124 Each class has its own
yield, and investors can invest in the particular class of their choosing.1 25
All investors receive semiannual interest payments in accordance with the
coupon rate for their class. 126 Principal payments on the underlying mort-
gage loans are combined and paid first to the holders of the shortest-matur-
ity bonds. 127 When the first class is fully retired, all of the principal is paid
next to the holders of the intermediate-maturity bonds. 128 The longest-ma-
turity bonds do not receive principal until all other classes are retired.
By dividing the pool into these various investment classes, investors can
more easily predict payment and yield on their investment. As a result
CMOs have been able to attract investors at lower interest rates than other
mortgage-backed securities.1 29  The ability to attract investors at lower
yields means that the CMO can be offered at a lower cost or rate, and the
savings can ultimately be passed on to homebuyers in the form of reduced
mortgage rates. ' 30
117. See Brendsel, supra note 72, at 35.
118. See id.; CMOs and the Secondary Markets, TR. & EST., July 1984, at 39. This cost
reduction of 1/4% is attributed to CMOs by analysts at the National Association of Realtors.
Id.
119. See Sloan, Your Money-Collateralized Mortgages, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1983, at 38,
col. 1.





125. See id.; Mailer, supra note 116, at 307 (such a series might be classified as fastest
maturity of 3.2 years; intermediate maturity of 8.6 years; and slowest maturity of 20.4 or more
years).
126. See Brendsel, supra note 72, at 35.
127. Id.
128. Id.




5. Bonds. Private issuers in the secondary mortgage market issue two basic
types of bonds: (1) mortgage-backed bonds (MBBs); and (2) pay-through
bonds.131 These bonds represent a debt obligation of the issuer that is collat-
eralized by mortgage loans. 132 The holders of the underlying loans for both
types of bonds do not sell the loans, but rather pledge them to repay the
debt. The loans cannot be used for any other purpose until the holders repay
the debt represented by the bonds. 133
Typically, MBBs are used by institutional lenders with respect to old and
very low interest rate loans that are not marketable for use with mortgage-
backed securities. For this reason, they are generally over-collateralized to
the extent of 150 percent to 200 percent of the indebtedness. 134 The bonds
generally have a maturity of five to ten years with the total amount of debt
due and payable at maturity. 135 The MBB pays interest to investors semian-
nually. 136 The pay-through bond, on the other hand, is a modified pass-
through security that provides monthly payments to investors. 137 Payments
from the underlying mortgages are thus distributed to the investors, but un-
like a standard pass-through security, investors have not purchased an own-
ership interest in the underlying mortgages. 138 The mortgages simply
collateralized the contractual debt obligation of the issuer. 139
Issuers of these types of bonds include homebuilders, commercial banks,
PMICs, savings and loan institutions, and investment banks.140
Homebuilders have recently found the pay-through bond attractive and have
used it to raise additional funds for their construction activities.141 Using
the pay-through bond, small homebuilders have successfully pooled their
purchase money mortgages on homes that they have built and sold bonds in
order to increase cash flow and compete with larger volume builders. 142
131. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 35; Mailer, supra note 116,
at 303-07.
132. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 35; Mailer, supra note 116,
at 303.
133. FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 35.
134. Id.: "The collateralization must be maintained at some established percentage of in-
debtedness through the addition of loans, as the outstanding principal balance of the collateral
loan balances is reduced through amortization and payoffs." See also Mailer, supra note 116,
at 303-04: "This overcollateralization is attributable to several investor concerns about (1) re-
payment of principal between valuation dates, (2) possible impairment of the value of the
collateral due to increases in interest rates, and (3) receiving protection against defaults of the
mortgages." Id. at 304 (footnote omitted). Investors also require over-collateralization be-
cause these bonds are debt obligations of the issuer and, therefore, raise concerns about the
creditworthiness of the issuer. Id. at 303-04.






141. See Anderson, Small Home Builders Band Together, URB. LAND, Aug. 1984, at 18,
19-20; Mailer, supra note 116, at 305.
142. See Mailer, supra note 116, at 305:
The pay-through enables homebuilders to raise capital by realizing the bond
value of their collateral. At the same time, the builder preserves its ability to use
installment sale tax accounting (and thereby defer taxation on a portion of its
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C. Expanding the Market
The success of the secondary mortgage market in bringing funds into the
housing market has prompted action to expand the availability of capital
assets in several other areas of real estate development. For instance, a sec-
ondary market and mortgage rating system have developed for commercial
loans. 143 A secondary market now exists for conventional loans on manu-
factured housing or mobile homes. 144 Legislation that would encourage a
secondary market for industrial mortgages is being considered as part of the
national drive to make American industry more competitive. 145 The emer-
gence of mutual funds that invest in mortgage-related securities is, at least
indirectly, enhancing investor involvement in the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. 146 In addition, a new practice of using PCs, MBSs, and Ginnie Maes to
collateralize commercial paper is giving some primary mortgage lenders ac-
cess to a broader investor base that could provide even greater capital infu-
sion for real estate development. 147
gain) for home sales for which the builder took back purchase money
mortgages.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Liles, Mortgage-Backed Securities-Current Status and Recent
Proposals, 25 TAX MGMT. MEMO, May 14, 1984, at 123-26 (discussing tax issues).
143. Standard & Poor's Corporation provides the rating system. The outstanding loans
secured by commercial or income-producing properties were $500 billion at the time of this
Article. The rating system and size of the commercial loan base provide a substantial founda-
tion for developing and issuing appropriate mortgage related securities. Rating System, supra
note 46, at 3; see Lipman, Rating of Bond Issue Backed by Building Might Make Projects Easier
to Finance, Wall St. J., May 24, 1985, at 24, col. 2 (American Express recently made a $450
million bond issue backed solely by its $700 million headquarters, under construction in lower
Manhattan's World Financial Center).
144. See Healthier Outlook for Manufactured Housing?, URB. LAND, Feb. 1985, at 24.
Currently about $20 billion in such loans are outstanding. GNMA has issued, as of April
1984, $4.2 billion in pass-through securities backed by loans on manufactured housing. Id.
Between September 1982 and August 1983 FHLMC purchased $19 million of these loans, and
two private entities, Foremost Financial Services Corporation and Northwest Mortgage Cor-
poration, have issued pass-through securities of $100 million and $45 million, respectively. Id.
145. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REP. No. 84-111 E, A SECONDARY MAR-
KET FOR INDUSTRIAL MORTGAGES: A NEW METHOD FOR FINANCING INDUSTRIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 1-33 (July 20, 1983). The report discusses industrial policy and the potential inflows
of capital that could be generated by a strong secondary mortgage market for industrial mort-
gages. Also discussed is the proposal for a new agency for the federal government to be known
as the Federal Industrial Mortgage Association or FIMA, which would have responsibility for
leading the development of such a market. Id.
146. See Geczi, Mortgage Capital, Investment Return Sought: Home Industry Offers Mu-
tual Fund, Washington Post, May 7, 1983, at E37, col. 1 (fund, called the Home Investors
Fund, is sponsored by the National Association of Realtors and the National Association of
Home Builders; money invested will be used to purchase securities issued by FNMA,
FHLMC, and GNMA); see also Bogdanich, supra note 73, at 35, col. 2 (discussing the success
of funds purchasing Ginnie Mae securities); Mutual Fund for Mortgages... Design Awards...
Trust Prices, Wall St. J., May 4, 1983, at 31, col. 1 (same story as reported on May 7 by the
Washington Post).
147. See 2 FREDDIE MAC REP., Dec. 1984, at 2. In October of 1984 Carteret Savings and
Loan Association of Morristown, New Jersey, established a program to issue up to $200 mil-
lion in collateralized commercial paper (short-term obligations). Id. Between then and De-
cember other lenders joined to issue $2.825 billion in commercial paper. Id. The new efforts
are designed to reach a broader base of investors and to tap a financial market where a lower
cost of funds can occasionally be found. Id. Like mortgage-backed bonds good credit ratings
for these issues require extensive over-collateralization. Id.
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The current operation of the secondary mortgage market is also the focus
of considerable attention. Efforts to enhance the current operation of the
secondary mortgage market are being made on all fronts. Proposals for ma-
jor tax code revision would allow better treatment for investments in mort-
gage-related securities. 148  Proposals to revise federal securities law
regulations would simplify compliance for mortgage-related securities issued
by private entities and reduce the burden of various state law requirements
through federal preemption. 149 Proposed revisions to laws restricting pen-
sion fund investment in mortgage-related securities would permit a greater
percentage of the estimated $800 billion of pension fund assets to be directed
to real estate transactions. 150 Finally, discussion is focusing on the need to
reduce the number of divergent state real property law issues that hinder the
free flow and marketability of secondary mortgage market securities because
of their impact on the underlying mortgage documentation and
enforceability. 15'
148. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 137-42, 145-46 (tax code can be used
to influence investments, and investments in activities that benefit residential mortgages should
be encouraged); Liles, supra note 142, at 123-28 (discussing various tax-related issues including
those related to Trusts for Investment in Mortgages (TIMs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs)); Martell, Taxation of the Mortgage Pool, 11 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 347, 347-58 (1984)
(proposed legislation for TIMs is discussed as a way of creating an investment vehicle that
would not result in double taxation at the entity level and investor level); see also Trost, Rea-
gan Plan to Increase Private Backing For Mortgages Appears to Have Failed, Wall St. J., Mar.
23, 1984, at 6, col. 2 (the primary opponents to TIMs regulation and other proposals to en-
courage increased private entity activity in the secondary mortgage market are the FHLMC
and FNMA; government linked agencies have 95% of the market and are afraid that new
legislation would give too much to private participants).
149. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 146-48 (recommending streamlined
registration procedure under federal securities laws and uniform exemption provisions under
state blue-sky laws); SENATE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, HOUSING, AND UR-
BAN AFFAIRS-THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1983, at 1-
19 (1983) (providing background information concerning the legislation); Legislative Changes
Broaden Powers of Secondary Market, 2 FREDDIE MAC REP., Nov. 1984, at 1 (the Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689, provides for
reduced registration procedures under the federal securities laws for mortgage-related
securities).
150. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 142-44 (suggesting revision to fed-
eral and state laws to create an environment for greater pension fund investment in real estate);
Mariano, Pension Funds Eyed as Loan Money Source, Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1983, at Fl,
col. 1 (currently only about 2% to 3% of the estimated $800 billion in pension fund assets is
invested in residential mortgages); Pension Fund Investment in Mortgages, LAND USE DIG.,
May 15, 1984, at 2 (between December 1980 and June 1983 the assets of private pension funds
were $526 billion, with $25.1 billion invested in mortgage-backed securities and $6.1 billion in
mortgages; public pension funds during this period had an estimated $238 billion in total assets
with about 12% invested in mortgage securities); see also Elbash, Social Policy Eyes Pension
Fund Assets, REAL EST. REV., Winter 1984, at 90-93 (looking at the need for greater pension
fund investment in real estate and noting a California law that pressures government pension
plans to earmark 25% of their assets for California mortgages); Monks, Facilitating Pension
Fund Investments in Residential Mortgages, 35 LAB. L.J. 387, 387-92 (1984) (adopted from
testimony before the labor-management subcommittee of the House Committee on Education
and Labor regarding barriers to pension fund investment and proposed legislation).
151. For example, the due-on-sale clause issue causes unnecessary problems with assessing
the enforceability of mortgage instruments in certain states and thereby discourages invest-
ment. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 150. Similar problems arise in dealing
with state securities law. Id. at 146-48. State law affects the secondary mortgage market in a
number of ways. States that seek to opt out of the federal preemption that made due-on-sale
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D. Why Participate in the Market?
Good reasons exist for both mortgage lenders and investors to participate
in the secondary mortgage market. The advantages to primary mortgage
lenders of selling loans include: (1) the ability to produce higher yields as
interest rates rise by selling existing loans to raise cash for reinvestment in
new loans at higher rates; (2) the ability to increase income from loan origi-
nation fees by making new loans with the cash generated from the sale of
existing loans; and (3) the ability to realize enhanced efficiencies as loan
volumes increase because of economies of scale that make record keeping
and loan servicing costs diminish on a per loan basis as the size of the entire
portfolio expands.' 5 2 For investors in mortgage-related securities the bene-
fits include: (1) the ability to purchase an investment pass-through security
that provides a monthly cash flow; (2) if interest rates are rising, the ability
to invest the monthly cash flow into higher yield investments for a greater
profit; falling interest rates eliminate this benefit; and (3) the ability to hold a
liquid investment related to mortgages. 53
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE FOSTERED BY THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET
The implications of the secondary mortgage market manifest themselves
in two broad and interrelated ways. First, the market has changed the man-
ner in which parties interact within the context of a real estate transaction.
Second, the market has altered the traditional view of the proper role of state
and federal government in administering and developing the law of real
property.
Dramatic growth in secondary mortgage market activity has significantly
influenced the way in which homebuyers/borrowers, lenders, developers,
and investors interact. 54 The increasing access to interregional, national,
clauses enforceable may have trouble selling their loans in the market. See 1985 State Legisla-
tive Proposals, supra note 43, at 1-2. Several states, in an effort to help borrowers, are consider-
ing moritoria on foreclosures; such action would hinder the marketability of their mortgages.
Id. at 2. Consumer legislation in some states is requiring "plain language" to be used in mort-
gage instruments, but this language is not the same as that used in the FHLMC and FNMA
uniform forms, and such requirements thus work against national goals of uniformity. Id.
Alternative mortgage instruments and state securities law issues have also presented recent
problems. Id. at 2, 5. Hazardous waste legislation in some states imposes "superliens" for
waste cleanup that would take priority over prior mortgage liens and thus upsets the security
for underlaying mortgages, making them poor investments. Id. at 2. Massachusetts, one state
that did this, was forced to admit its error of judgment and exempted residential property. Id.;
see Lipman, Unwitting Owners May Owe for Cleanup of Toxic Wastes, Wall St. J., Aug. 1,
1984, at 23, col. 1 (discussing the hazardous waste "superlien" problem and the decision by
FHLMC to pull out of the market in Massachusetts because of the need to purchase first lien
mortgages).
152. See FHLMC, THE SECONDARY MARKET, supra note 1, at 41. See generally Seiders,
supra note 47, at 324-25 (discussing other reasons for the secondary mortgage market such as
to reduce geographic imbalances in the demand for mortgage credit).
153. See supra note 152.
154. See Explosive Growth in Secondary Mortgage Market Trading, LAND USE DIG., Oct.
15, 1984, at 3 ("Explosive growth in secondary mortgage market trading is the most significant
housing finance development of the 1980s .... [t]he estimated volume of trading in mortgage
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and international capital markets has changed the very nature and structure
of traditional housing and real estate market operations. 55 For instance, the
flow of funds through the secondary mortgage market to primary mortgage
lenders affects housing affordability. 156 Most homebuyers apply for loans at
local banks and savings institutions. These institutions, especially in high
growth areas like the sunbelt, depend to a great extent on the availability of
pass-through securities used by federal agencies soared from $100 billion to over $500 billion
from 1981 to 1983."); Mortgage Securities Spur New Financing Techniques, 3 FREDDIE MAC
REP., May 1985, at I (securitization-turning residential mortgages into securities-has revo-
lutionized the business of housing finance by making more money available for housing than
ever before; at the end of 1984, the volume of outstanding mortgage pass-through securities
stood at over $286 billion); Pierce, supra note 102, at 10 (since 1970 Ginnie Mae has issued
guarantees on more than $200 billion in securities, and principal balance outstanding on these
securities is more than $170 billion; by this means, some 4.4 million homes have been fi-
nanced); Shattering Traditions, supra note 24, at 3-4 (from 1977 to 1983, originations fluctu-
ated, but purchases grew steadily; purchase volume more than tripled in six years, going from
approximately $50 billion in 1977 to more than $162 billion in 1983).
155. For commentary on expanding interregional and national capital markets, see 0.
JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 24-25 (a developed secondary mortgage market would
bring more equality of interest rates between regions and local communities by more easily
shifting funds from capital-surplus to capital-deficit areas); Brendsel, supra note 72, at 35-37
(mortgage-related securities are discussed in the context of their successful emergence in capi-
tal markets; the growth of the secondary mortgage market is seen as "nothing short of phe-
nomenal" and has managed to tap national capital markets at a rate of from $0 in 1970 to
more than $200 billion in 1982); Mortgage-Related Securities, supra note 24, at 1 (mortgage-
related securities are seen as serious competition to other investments and are appealing to a
wide range of investors); Secondary Market in ARMs Expected to Emerge over Next Decade, 3
FREDDIE MAC REP., Feb. 1985, at 1-2 [hereinafter cited as Secondary Market] (ability to use
the interregional and national capital markets to aid in housing finance is illustrated by Cali-
fornia institutions being able to lend out $27 billion more than their total instate capital in-
flow); Strine, supra note 52, at 1024-25 (Utah savings and loan with assets of only $42 million
able to lend $58.2 million in 1976); Wantuck, supra note 24, at 32-35 (success of mortgage-
related securities in attracting investment in the national capital markets outlined). Wantuck
asserts that these mortgage-related securities have provided investors with better performance
than comparable corporate bonds over much of the last ten years. Id. at 32. She relies in part
on statements by Jack Carlson, then-current chief economist of the National Association of
Realtors:
Savings once were concentrated in the community ... but in recent years "we
have tended to nationalize our savings." Insurance, pension funds and the like
"have siphoned savings into the large financial centers.". . . For housing... "it
is imperative to go where those funds have gone, to where those pots of money
are," and the secondary market has been a means of doing so.
Id. (citations omitted).
The impact of increasing access to international capital markets is discussed in 3 FREDDIE
MAC REP., Jan. 1985, at 4 (Prudential Realty Securities III, a subsidiary of the Prudential
Insurance Company of America has recently issued in Europe $1.3 billion of fixed-maturity
bonds collateralized by commercial mortgages); 3 FREDDIE MAC REP., Mar. 1985, at 4 (Fan-
nie Mae recently issued debentures of 50 billion Japanese yen (approximately $200 million) in
the Japanese bond market, and New England Mutual Life Insurance Company is selling $300
million in mortgage-related securities in the Eurobond market); Pierce, supra note 102, at 8
(selected Ginnie Mae securities were listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange in January
1984; since the beginning of these foreign listings, hundreds of millions of dollars in housing
capital have flowed from Europe to Asia to the United States).
156. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 38, at 48; 0. JONES & L.
GREBLER, supra note 3, at 25, 90-91; Lance, supra note 45, at 427 (cost of mortgage credit
could be reduced by as much as /2 of 1%). See generally Home Economics, supra note 45, at
1, col. 6; Nelson, Special Report 1984, supra note 23, at 24, 30 (potential exists to provide
savings of 2% on cost of a home).
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interregional, national, or international funds to supply their capital require-
ments. I 57  Purely local concerns of the parties to the transactions must,
therefore, give way to the intrusion of national standards of uniformity and
investment acceptability. '5 8 Thus, if homebuyers expect a continuing supply
of affordable home-financing, they must also accept the conditions of access
to nonlocal capital markets that will make new sources of investment capital
available for local real estate development. 1 59 Because the secondary market
can attract and direct these new sources of capital and should thereby reduce
157. See, e.g., Home Economics, supra note 45, at 1, col. 6.
158. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 397-435. Jensen asserts:
That the law follows the path taken by society's economic needs is a truism,
albeit everyone recognizes that the speed with which the law follows in the wake
of economic developments varies greatly. Of all common law legal categories
none has until recently been quite so resistant to change as the law of real prop-
erty .... A segment of real estate law which until now has been peculiarly
resistant to innovation has been the law of mortgages.
Id. at 397. He then goes on to discuss the secondary mortgage market and how it has been
effective in bringing pressure for change and for more uniform standards. Id. at 397-403.
See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 38, at 5-20 (volatile interest rates in
the 1960s prompted an increased federal concern for housing finance and regulation); 0.
JONES & L. GREBLER, supra note 3, at 45; MILES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
ISSUE BRIEF, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS: MAJOR LEGISLATION 1-14 (Sept. 10,
1984) (recent federal proposals to assist the standardization and accessibility of the secondary
mortgage market); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 147-54 (discussing various
needs for modification of state laws and for more uniform documentation and regulation that
will facilitate investment in and development of housing finance markets); Leibold, supra note
55, at 435-40 (discussing uniform standard for mortgages); Murray, supra note 1, at 446-50
(discussing standardization of mortgage documents).
Commentary to the Uniform Simplification of Land Transactions Act states:
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which
the immense variety of financing secured by real estate can go forward with
greater certainty and less transaction cost.... CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS...
The Congress finds (1) that disparate State laws relating to the foreclosure of
real estate mortgages and deeds of trust have inhibited the free flow of mortgage
money to homeowners at reasonable rates in many States and regions of the
Nation and have burdened Federal programs involving real estate mortgages
made, owned, insured or guaranteed by the United States; ...
(5) that the availability of a uniform, less expensive, and more expeditious
foreclosure procedure is required to ameliorate these conditions, and facilitate
the sale and resale in nationwide secondary mortgage markets of secured real
estate loans made, owned, insured, or guaranteed by the United States and
would remove existing burdens on interstate commerce.
UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT art. 3, introductory comment (Official Text 1978). For
articles discussing the Uniform Land Transactions Act, see Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform
Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976); Randolph, The
FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Home Improvement Loan Note: The Secondary Market Meets the
Consumer Movement, 60 N.C.L. REV. 365 (1982). See also Hughes, Mortgage Sales by Com-
puter Hit Snags, Wall St. J., May 24, 1985, at 21, col. 2 (reports wide use of computer net-
works, but also speaks to the issue of high costs); LaGesse, Mortgage Networks Arrange Loans
on Computers, AM. BANKER, Jan. 23, 1984, at 1 (a new network of computerized information
is facilitating lending and secondary mortgage market activities, but its continued development
depends on standardized mortgage forms and practices).
159. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 38, at 48; 0. JONES & L.
GREBLER, supra note 3, at 25, 90-91; Lance, supra note 45, at 427 (the cost of mortgage credit
could be reduced by as much as 1/2 of 1%); see also Home Economics, supra note 45, at 1, col.
6; Nelson, Special Report 1984, supra note 23, at 30 (there is potential to provide a savings of
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financing costs for homebuyers, 160 homebuyers have an interest in maintain-
ing a strong secondary market.
An active secondary mortgage market also benefits local mortgage lenders
by providing them with the opportunity to originate and service many more
loans than would be possible if they merely held all of their loans in portfolio
until maturity. 16 1 The market increases the local mortgage lenders' liquidity
and thereby enhances long-term profitability by giving them greater access
to the capital markets and better protection against interest rate changes.
The market also provides indirectly a source of substantial income through
loan origination and servicing fees. 162
Both the reduction in home financing costs and the increased ability to
provide loans to a given local market constitute positive economic benefits
for real estate development. These positive economic benefits for the
homebuyer/borrower and lender, however, are not without their costs. A
local mortgage lender that aggressively taps nonlocal markets for primary
mortgage funds may shift from using and managing local funds for local
investments to mass retailing of loans, local and otherwise, for sale in the
secondary mortgage market. 163 In this manner the local mortgage lender
2% on the cost of a home). See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at xv, 9-
13 (housing that is affordable is a national priority).
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has initiated a number of pilot
programs of affordable housing in various parts of the country: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Hous-
ING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION A CASE
STUDY MESA COUNTY, COLORADO (Jan. 1984); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION A CASE STUDY CRIT-
TENDEN COUNTY, ARKANSAS (Jan. 1984); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION A CASE STUDY OF ELK-
HART COUNTY, INDIANA (Jan. 1984); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION A CASE STUDY PHOENIX,
ARIZONA (Jan. 1984); see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CIT-
IZEN ACTION FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING INFORMATION KIT (1984).
160. See supra note 156.
161. See Lance, supra note 45, at 427-28 (as an example, reference is given to the early
success of United Savings and Loan of Utah that in 1976 had only $42 million in assets yet
originated $58.2 million in new mortgages while servicing an additional $119 million worth of
debt); Shealy, supra note 45, at 35 (involvement in secondary mortgage market increases li-
quidity and profitability); see also Secondary Market, supra note 155, at 1 (California lenders
focused on origination services and were able, by use of the secondary mortgage market, to
originate $27 billion more in loans than they had in local capital assets between the years 1977-
1980).
162. See Bankers Forum, supra note 45, at 9-10 (originating and selling mortgages in secon-
dary market provides liquidity and profitability for lenders concerned with volatile interest
rates and risks of holding long-term mortgages); Shattering Traditions, supra note 24, at 2-11
(secondary mortgage market allows for greater liquidity, profitability, and for hedging invest-
ments against inflation); Shealy, supra note 45, at 35-41 (involvement in secondary mortgage
market increases liquidity and sources of profitability); see also 0. JONES & L. GREBLER, supra
note 3, at 23-24; Cahnman, Kamradt & Otto, supra note 45, at 10-16 (discussing economic
consequences of a well-functioning secondary market).
163. See generally Bankers Forum, supra note 45, at 9-10 ("The executive vice-president of
a $7-million-in-assets bank in Wisconsin says that his bank doesn't write anything it can't turn
around and sell."); Nelson, Special Report 1983, supra note 23, at 12 (referring to the extensive
secondary mortgage market activities of lenders, the article quotes the complaints of speakers
at a conference sponsored by BNA's Housing and Development Reporter: "The mortgage busi-
ness is dead; every mortgage lender is now in the securities business."); Shealy, supra note 45,
at 35-41.
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may redefine its self-image and restructure its operations to facilitate the di-
recting of local and individual needs into prepackaged arrangments that are
acceptable for resale rather than tailoring services to meet local and individ-
ual needs. As a result, the borrower and lender relationship changes and
becomes less personal.
Investor requirements of the secondary mortgage market also affect the
projects of real estate developers. 164 Consequently, developers should seek
to modify their projects to ensure that project construction standards and
legal documentation will be acceptable to the major secondary market enti-
ties. If the developer ensures that the secondary market will accept the pri-
mary mortgage loans secured by the developed property, then more primary
mortgage lenders will be willing to extend mortgage financing to the project
based on the greater liquidity of such mortgages. Even if the developer plans
to offer its own purchase money mortgage financing to individual property
buyers, it should consider the requirements of the secondary mortgage mar-
ket investor. If the underlying purchase money mortgages satisfy investor
expectations by resembling other standard mortgages, then the developer re-
tains the potential to issue builder bonds.' 65 In this manner access to the
capital markets can be used to finance continued real estate development.
Through the secondary mortgage market, the homebuyer/borrower,
lender, developer, and investor interact. Even though the secondary market
investor does not directly participate in the underlying transaction, the im-
portance of the secondary market process to the continued financing of real
estate development makes the investor an indirect participant. The indirect
participation of unrelated investors has significantly changed the point of
reference for interaction in real estate transactions. Increasingly, direct par-
ties must refer to the objectives and business standards of unknown investors
as benchmarks for the conduct of what superficially appears to be a local real
estate transaction.
In addition to changing the manner in which parties to a real estate trans-
action interact, the secondary mortgage market has affected the perceived
roles of state and federal government in administering and developing real
property law. The financing of real estate development increasingly appears
to require access to interregional, national, and international capital mar-
kets. 166 The ability of state government alone to administer and develop
164. See Sanders, Condominium Legal Requirements of the Secondary Mortgage Market,
1981 FLA. B.J. 733, 733-35 (discussing guidelines for proper drafting of condominium docu-
ments so that resulting mortgages on projects will be acceptable in secondary mortgage
market).
165. For further discussion, see supra notes 46-153 and accompanying text. This section
discusses mortgage-backed bonds and their use by builders. When these bonds are backed by
the builder's purchase money mortgage they are sometimes referred to as builder bonds. Note
that the secondary mortgage market would seem to be able to serve the additional purpose of
reducing developers' tendencies to use onerous legal documentation. Thus, in an indirect sense
marketability considerations also provide some degree of consumer protection.
166. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 137 ("greater participation in mort-
gage investment by private financial institutions with diversified asset portfolios is essential for
the broad based and resilient system of housing finance needed to meet the demands for mort-
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appropriate law is thus diminishing. The nonlocal capital markets require a
degree of uniformity in both documentation and underlying real property
law so that investors can easily access alternative investments without de-
tailed investigation of particular lenders and particular state law. 167 Like-
wise, the ability of secondary mortgage market entities to issue securities
based on mortgages requires a substantial degree of national uniformity in
order to make the underlying pooling arrangements manageable. 168
With the success and variety of the various mortgage-related securities
currently available, pressure to facilitate the further development of the sec-
ondary mortgage market has increased. 169 The success of the market in
bringing new sources of capital to real estate development has bestowed
upon the market a reputation as the "goose that lays the golden eggs." In-
deed, real estate transactions appear to be capable of attracting a substantial
portion of the billions of dollars available for capital investment if the appro-
priate legal changes are made to facilitate a competitive market for the origi-
nation, issuance, and resale of mortgage-related securities.
The success of the secondary mortgage market has demonstrated that real
estate transactions are matters of national, not purely state and local, con-
cern. The success and viability of a national housing policy and of a national
policy to revive our financially troubled lending institutions depends, at least
in part, on a healthy secondary mortgage market that by its very nature is
national in scope. 170 Consequently, for the law to facilitate a competitive
market in mortgage-related securities authority must exist at the national
level to coordinate, administer, and develop appropriate regulations and
legal doctrines.
The secondary mortgage market thus is serving as a catalyst for change by
elevating certain issues of real property law from purely state law concerns
to federal concerns. In this respect federal legislation has recently addressed
gage credit in the economic environment of the 1980's."). See generally supra note 155 (dis-
cussing the growth of the secondary market).
167. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 397-435. This article discusses the contribution of FHA
to standardization and then goes into extensive discussion of the efforts of the FHLMC and
FNMA to develop standardized forms to facilitate the secondary mortgage market and the
ability to attract new capital assets to the housing market. See also 0. JONES & L. GREBLER,
supra note 3, at 152-54 (the federal government sees a role for its related entities to be instru-
mental in introducing new mortgage instruments and in establishing more uniform standards
that will facilitate the operation of the secondary mortgage market); Guttentag, supra note 25,
at 235-36 (even with the introduction of adjustable rate mortgages the secondary mortgage
market exerts pressure for uniformity of mortgage instruments since small volume results in
thin markets and poor prices); Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt, supra note 23, at 15 (Pratt says
that in buying a mortgage one will be very concerned about the location of the property and
the local state law; uniformity is needed to terminate some of this risk).
168. Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt, supra note 23, at 15.
169. See supra notes 46-153 and accompanying text.
170. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 137; Shealy, supra note 45, at 35-41
(participating in the market makes lenders more liquid and more profitable); Wantuck, supra
note 24, at 32 (the success of housing policy depends on our ability to tap national capital
markets). See generally Hermel, supra note 38, at 27-28, 32 (recent changes in the law that
allow lenders to offer more services and alternative mortgages have lead to increased assets);
How Thrifts Use Garn-St. Germain, supra note 38, at 14-16 (the flexibility of this legislation
can improve a lender's asset position).
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the issues of mortgage due-on-sale clause enforceability, 171 usury limita-
tions, 172 and the ability of mortgage lenders to offer new and innovative
mortgages as alternatives to the fixed-rate, thirty-year mortgage. 73 This
recent activity follows previous federal intrusion on real estate transaction
and finance law issues under such legislation as the Interstate Land Sale Full
Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 174 anti-redlining legislation, 175 truth-in-lending
requirements, 176 and securities law requirements. 177 The implication seems
clear: the secondary mortgage market is transforming real estate transac-
tions into matters of national concern and, through the vehicle of federal
law, should bring greater uniformity to real property law and practice.
171. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 42, at 243-312. This article provides an excellent
overview of the due-on-sale problem and the legislative response to it. Details of the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)) are
discussed, including the types of lenders and loans covered by the Act's preemption and the
operation of a "window period" for the preemption in the various states. Id. at 260-309. The
Act leaves some room for individual states qualifying for a "window period" of exemption to
extend the exemption from federal preemption, but in no case can a state absolutely prohibit
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. Id. at 296. See also Barad & Layden, supra note 42, at
138-50 (discussing implication of federal preemption of due-on-sale clause); Berryhill, supra
note 36, at 35-116 (discussing the requirements of the due-on-sale clause); Blocher, supra note
36, at 49-99 (discussing due-on-sale clauses in relationship to secondary mortgage market);
Herron, supra note 42, at 529-43 (discussing extent of preemption); McGuire, supra note 36, at
487-532 (discussing due-on-sale clauses as restraints on alienation); Murry, supra note 42, at
229-42 (discussing legality of due-on-sale clauses in adjustable rate mortgages); Rudolph,
Schmelzer & Weiner, supra note 42, at 1311-27 (discussing federal preemption of due-on-sale
clauses).
172. See Ewing & Vickers, supra note 41, at 171-98. The most far-reaching preemption by
the federal government in this area occurred as a part of the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982), which effectively elimi-
nated state interest caps on first loans to residences. Id. The federal legislation was set up to
allow states to opt out of the preemption by acting before April 1, 1983. Id. at 176. At least
ten states did so. Id. For background perspective on the usury issue, see Crafton, supra note
41, at 135-45, and Nosari & Lewis, supra note 41, at 30-38.
173. See Sclar, supra note 39, at 273-79.
174. See Malloy, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: It's Requirements, Conse-
quences, and Implications for Persons Participating in Real Estate Development, 24 B.C.L.
REV. 1187, 1187-1239 (1983) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the ILSFDA, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1720 (1982), and its effect on lenders, developers and others); Morris, The Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evaluation, 24 S.C.L. REv. 331, 331-56 (1972).
175. See Bettauer, Federal and State Anti-Redlining Laws: Must National Banks Comply
With Both?, 97 BANKING L.J. 329, 329-45 (1980) (this legislation was designed to make loans
available to all neighborhoods and prevent lenders from avoiding neighborhoods merely be-
cause they are low income or racially integrated). For an example of federal anti-redlining
legislation, see The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1982).
176. See Young, Land Sales and Development: Some Legal and Conceptual Considerations,
3 REAL EST. L.J. 44, 55 (1974) (truth-in-lending legislation, a result of the consumer protec-
tion movement, required credit disclosure and added new burdens to the land sales industry).
177. See Malloy, Lender Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 53, 87-89, 95-96 (the securities laws apply to real estate transactions if a real estate
contract is classified as an investment contract). See generally Real Estate-FTC Starting to
Crack Down on Ads for Home Financing, Wall St. J., June 1, 1983, at 33, col. 1 (the Federal
Trade Commission has been reviewing home financing ads in an effort at consumer protec-
tion); Young, supra note 176, at 44-63 (discussing the impact of Federal Trade Commission
activities and environmental law regulations); Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO.
L.J. 1885, 1885-1905 (1984) (discussing use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zation Act (RICO) to allege fraud in the setting of "prime rate," which is a base for mortgage




From its inception, the secondary mortgage market has been greatly influ-
enced by federal legislation and the active participation of government-
related entities. 178 These entities, the GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC, still
comprise the major source of secondary mortgage market activity. 179 With
the increased acceptance among investors of mortgage-related securities
such as Ginnie Maes, MBSs, PCs, CMOs, and MBBs, however, participation
in the market by private entities has become increasingly profitable and man-
ageable. New efforts are also underway to expand the market beyond the
traditional realm of residential mortgages to include commercial mortgages,
mobile home mortgages, and industrial mortgages. Revisions to the tax
code, pension fund regulations, and securities laws designed to enhance in-
vestment opportunities in mortgage-related securities are also under
consideration.
The development of this secondary mortgage market has put a process in
motion for creating structural change in the conduct of real estate transac-
tions. The success of mortgage-related securities in the capital markets has
opened the door to new sources of funds for real estate development, to more
affordable housing, and to increased financial strength for financially trou-
bled lending institutions. At the same time the success of the market has
fostered a change in the interaction of the homebuyer/borrower, lender, de-
veloper, and investor by changing the point of reference from the parties'
local concerns to a concern for the objectives and business standards of unre-
lated market investors. The very success of the secondary mortgage market
has also demonstrated that for growth to be maintained the federal govern-
ment must play a greater role in administering and developing national stan-
dards of uniformity that will enhance the market position and acceptability
of mortgage-related securities.
The secondary mortgage market must, therefore, be viewed as a catalyst
for significant change in the conduct of real estate transactions. Failure to
recognize this development, to understand the market, and to go beyond the
pure mechanics of the market's operation will leave one ill-equipped to deal
with the emerging complexities of the law of real estate transactions and
finance.
178. See Seiders, supra note 47, at 319-20.
179. See Mortgage-Related Securities, supra note 24, at 1 ("The three quasi-public secon-
dary mortgage market agencies-FNMA, GNMA, and FHLMC-accounted for 95% of the
mortgage-backed securities volume transacted by the end of 1983."); Shattering Traditions,
supra note 24, at 2, 4 (in 1983 the FHLMC, FNMA, and GNMA accounted for over 61% of
the secondary mortgage market); Wantuck, supra note 24, at 32-35.
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